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ABSTRACT
This study explores domestic mergers and acquisitions across regions. The study is
based on the comprehensive public data on domestic mergers and acquisitions that is
matched to the micro-level data sources maintained by Statistics Finland in order to
obtain variables that help to characterize the companies involved. The Finnish evidence
reveals that geographical closeness matters a great deal for mergers and acquisitions
within a single country. This means that a great number of domestic takeovers occur
within narrowly defined regions. In other words, there is a strong home bias in domestic
mergers and acquisitions. In addition, domestic merger flows substantially reinforce the
core-periphery dimension. The results from matched data show that the strong ability by
an acquiring company to monitor the target (measured by the knowledge embodied in
human capital) is able to support mergers that occur across distant locations, other things
being equal. Geographical closeness and proximity across industries are not related,
based on the Finnish evidence.
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1.  Introduction
Companies play an important role in the reallocation of resources. The geography of
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in Finland is particularly interesting, because regional
disparities are sharp. As the European Union average is standardized as 100, the level of
gross domestic product per capita is 141 in the province of Uusimaa, which includes the
region around the Helsinki metropolitan area in Southern Finland, where roughly a third
of the total economic activity of the Finnish economy is located. In contrast, by using
the same measure, the level of GDP per capita is 75 in Eastern Finland (Behrens, 2003).
This means that the dynamics of inter-regional merger flows is relevant from the
regional policy perspective in Finland.
The aim of this study is to investigate the previously unexplored pattern of domestic
inter-regional mergers in Finland during the last decade. This study contributes to the
literature on domestic inter-regional mergers by using matched data. This means that the
study is based on the comprehensive public data on domestic mergers that is matched to
the micro-level data sources maintained by Statistics Finland in order to obtain variables
that help to characterize the companies involved. By doing this, this study is able to
characterize the geographical closeness of mergers and acquisitions more deeply than
the previous empirical studies that have applied aggregate data.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. The second section provides theoretical
considerations for the importance of geographical closeness in domestic M&As. The
third section includes a survey of the empirical literature. The fourth section contains a
description of the matched data. The fifth section documents that geographical closeness
is a matter of great importance for domestic takeovers in the Finnish regions. The sixth
section provides the estimation results for the firm-level factors that help to characterize
the geographical closeness of domestic mergers and acquisitions. The last section
concludes.
2.  Theoretical considerations
There are several theoretical reasons for the relevance of geographical closeness in
domestic mergers and acquisitions. The first explanation stems from the consequences3
of product differentiation that has been explored in detail in the earlier literature. The
second explanation considers asymmetric information. Poor monitoring from afar
cannot distinguish a good target from an average target. This gives an information
advantage for the potential acquirer who is located close to the target firm. In addition,
poor information of the target that is associated with a long distance, may have a
negative effect on the firm’s ability to internalise the potential synergies associated with
takeovers. The third explanation relies on increasing returns. This study considers a case
in which the firms – which are located close to each other – are jointly able to take
advantage of a common asset.
2.1. Spatial competition
In certain industries the distance between the client and the firm is an important
component of product quality or the firm’s costs. Because firms’ locations vary,
products become differentiated. In the spatial competition models the impact of
geographical closeness on the M&As is highly contingent on the assumed nature of
conjectures which describe how the other firms respond to a unit change in the output of
a firm considered. Cournot conjecture implies no response in terms of output. In
Bertrand competition, firms compete in setting prices, and then output responses
diverge. Levy and Reitzes (1992) show that a merger of nearby companies – which
eases competition – increases the merged firms’ profits in the spatial Bertrand price
competition.
1 This means that there is an incentive for nearby companies to form
coalitions in spatial price competition. In contrast, Mathushima (2001) shows that a
merge of nearby companies, however, produces a decline in the merged companies
profits in the standard non-cooperative Cournot competition. These results show that the
role of geographical closeness in the determination of domestic mergers and
acquisitions cannot be solved by theoretical considerations based on the traditional
frameworks of industrial organization.
2.2. Asymmetric information
Asymmetric information may be an important reason for the phenomenon, according to
which the parties of M&As tend to be located close to each other. The literature on
knowledge spillovers stresses that the tacit and human-embodied nature of knowledge4
has a central role in knowledge transfers (see e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Morgan
2004). The transmission of tacit knowledge presumes face-to-face contact or other
mechanisms which require spatial proximity (von Hippel 1994; Morgan 2004). For this
reason, it is logical to assume that the geographical restrictions which govern the
transmission of knowledge also have an impact on the assessment of the value of a
target by a potential acquirer. This implies that an increase in the distance between a
target and an acquirer impairs the ability of an acquirer to monitor the value of the
target.
Jaffe et al. (1993), Keller (2002), Maurseth and Verspagen (2002), Greuntz (2003),
among others, document the fact that knowledge and technology flows are dampened by
geographical distance. Grünfeld (2002) stresses that one interpretation of this regularity
is that more resources are needed to enable learning from innovations that are
undertaken at a geographical distance. According to this, a firm’s ability to absorb
knowledge from regions, which is located far away, is difficult. Concerning M&As, the
findings above hint that it becomes more difficult to evaluate the value of a target when
it is located far from an acquirer.
In the empirical literature it has been, in fact, argued that the geographical closeness
between acquiring and potential target companies improves monitoring or at least
decreases the monitoring costs and should therefore have a substantial positive impact
on the scale of inter-regional merger flows (see e.g. Green 1990; Ashcroft et al. 1994).
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It is not, however, obvious that a more precise assessment of the value of a target
actually matters insofar as firms are risk-neutral. The following reasoning gives an
explanation why the presence of asymmetric information can indeed promote mergers
and acquisitions between firms which locate close to each other and why more accurate
monitoring by acquiring companies could alleviate the problem raised by distance.
Gehrig (1993) considers a situation in which domestic risk-averse investors observe the
payoffs of domestic firms with higher precision than risk-averse foreign investors. The
foreigner’s estimate of the expected return is unbiased but it has a large variance around
the mean which makes a foreign target risky. This model for cross-border equity
transfers explains the home bias phenomenon, according to which, the amount of
investments abroad are empirically observed to be much less than the optimal5
diversification of investment portfolio would suggest. Concerning acquisitions, the
decision-makers are firms and not single investors. For this reason, the assumption of
the actor’s risk-averseness is no longer particularly well founded. Gordon and
Bovenberg (1996) explain home bias puzzle in the setting in which risk-neutral foreign
investors buy shares from the risk-neutral domestic owners. They rely on the
assumption, according to which, such a firm specific output shock arises which only the
domestic owners learn afterwards. Due to this asymmetry, only the targets which yield
the lowest returns are offered to foreigners who, being aware of this, however, may find
it profitable to buy foreign firms, if the foreign discount rate is below the domestic rate.
Lehto (2004) has presented an instructive model in which a target firm is sold to one
from three potential acquirers. Another acquirer is assumed to be better informed. Lehto
(2004) then shares the assumption of Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) according to which
the poor information appears as a bias between the actual value and the expected value.
Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) considered, however, the condition on which a domestic
owner sells the firm’s shares to a foreign investor. Then only the buyer makes a bid and
the seller accepts this bid, if it exceeds the net present value of the firm to the owner. In
this setting the better informed domestic owner is not be aware about the
informativeness of the potential buyer and because the owner does not bid, it has not to
take into consideration the bidding strategy of the foreign buyer. Lehto (2004)
considered a situation in which possibly two or three potential acquirers bid for a target.
One bidder is uninformed and knows only the distribution about the target’s possible
values. Other two bidders are fully aware of the target’s value for them. In the situation
under consideration each party is also aware about the information which the other party
possesses and about the bidding strategy which the opponent party is going to follow at
least, if the target is equally valuable to all potential acquirers. Lehto (2004) then shows
that it is highly unlikely that an uninformed bidder will buy the target. Only if an
uninformed acquirer obtains some additional advantage from the acquisition – which the
other bidders do not obtain – will it take over.
The long distance between a target and an acquiring company may also imply that a
target firm and an acquiring firm have communication problems and that these firms do
not “share the same language” in the sense defined by Breschi and Lissoni (2001). This
would also restrict the opportunities to internalise the potential synergies of an M&A,6
and give one explanation to observed home bias in M&As. We believe that, in
particular, an increase in the educational level of an acquirer’s staff improves the
willingness to communicate and abilities to understand each other. This alleviates the
obstacles in internalising the potential synergies.
2.3. Sharing common assets
In an enlarged version of this study, we consider a situation in which the parties of the
merger may jointly use the assets which the new parent firm possesses after the merger.
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Owing to this, the scope for profitable mergers may widen in the limited geographical
area. More closely, our analysis is based on the model which is not too far from the
model analysed by Perry and Porter (1985). We have assumed that the inverse of
demand function is linear in output and that the technology is determined from Cobb-
Douglas so that  k k k K L q =  where  k q  denotes firm k’s output,  k K is firm k’s capital
input and  k L is firm k’s labour input. Unlike Perry and Porter (1985), or Farrell and
Shapiro (1990) in the more general framework, we assume that the capital input is also
a decision variable. Assuming that the joint use of  k K lowers the capital costs, the
prospects for profitable mergers widen. Then not only in duopoly as in Salant et al.
(1983) but also in the market of several firms there arises an opportunity for profitable
mergers.
To obtain costs savings through a merger in this setting requires that the merger does
not remove the pre-merger production sites. In some cases too long distance between
the merged firms may hinder the use of these common assets. In any kind of network
industries the location of the tangible assets which belong to the network may determine
the area under which the joint utilization of the network is possible. This especially
concerns many service industries. The location of the depots, the warehouses and the
various supporting activities can limit the geographical scope of cooperation and M&As
in the wholesale trade and the transport industries and in other services. In addition,
after the merger the utilization of human capital – and the technological and managerial
knowledge which is incorporated in human capital – can also, to some extent, be shared
by those production sites which were independent firms before the merger. For earlier7
discussed reasons the distant location of a production site may be a handicap that
produces extra costs for companies involved.
3. Previous related studies
There has been extensive empirical literature on various direct and indirect effects of
merger flows on regional economies (see e.g. Ashcroft and Love, 1993). However, there
have been a limited number of empirical studies that aim to characterize the economic
fundamentals that have an influence on merger flows across regions within countries. In
addition, these studies have been based on aggregated data. The following investigation
that is based on the Finnish data is able to provide a previously neglected micro-level
perspective on this important issue.
The earlier empirical studies have applied aggregate data on U.S., Canadian, UK and
German inter-regional merger flows. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) observe that only a
very small portion of the total geographic concentration is attributable to intrafirm
agglomeration in the U.S. manufacturing industries. This pattern means that there is an
important role for domestic merger flows in the concentration of economic activity
within industries. In other words, the pace of inter-firm reallocation may have an
important influence on the magnitude of agglomeration. Green and Gromley (1984),
Green (1987) and Green (1990) investigate the U.S. pattern in takeovers across regions.
They discover that distance is indeed an important factor in the determination of
regional takeovers as suggested by the famous gravity equation of inter-regional
interaction. In addition, Sorenson and Stuart (2003) point out that geographical
proximity matters a great deal for venture capital investments in the U.S. states via
transmission of information about the potential investment opportunities.
Green and McNaughton (1989), and Aliberti and Green (1999) provide empirical
evidence from Canada. They conclude that the acquisition process across regions is
reinforcing the core-periphery nature of Canada’s urban system. In particular, domestic
merger activity is heavily concentrated in four major concentrations of economic
activity that are Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and Calgary. In addition, Green and
Lisle (1991) investigate the inter-regional merger flows in Canada by using the Markov
chain models. The results show that there is strong empirical evidence for the distance8
decay effect. This pattern is highlighted in the feature that only a limited number of
cities made acquisitions in cities other than their own.
Ashcroft et al. (1994) provide the available UK empirical evidence. The sectoral
coverage of the study is limited, because their study excludes banking, insurance,
finance and other services. The study discovers that the estimation of gravity equation
provides an appropriate framework for the empirical investigation of regional takeover
activity in the UK. Consistent with the famous gravity equation of inter-regional
interaction, there is a decrease in the total volume of takeovers as there is an increase in
the distance between regions, and an increase in the total number of inter-regional
takeovers as there is an increase in the size of regional economic potential measured by
the value of domestic product.
Rodriguez-Pose and Zademach (2003) have concluded that M&As has resulted in a
major concentration of firms and economic activity in the main German metropoli. The
study on the determinants of M&As is based on aggregated information about the
background characteristics of the German regions in the 1990s. Rodriguez-Pose and
Zademach (2003) discover that proximity plays an important role in the dynamics of
M&A activity, when estimated in conjunction with agglomeration.
4. The data
4.1. The selection of variables
The matched data is created in order to obtain variables that can be used to characterize
the geographical closeness of domestic mergers and acquisitions. This matching is made
possible by the inclusion of the unique identification codes for the population of firms
used in different registers maintained by Statistics Finland. Most of the included
variables can be interpreted from the point of monitoring and available information.
Some variables can also be interpreted to reflect the possession of the assets whose
common use may face geographical restrictions.
The variables used in the empirical investigation are documented in Table 1. The age of
a company is directly related to the available information. Older firms are often listed9
and there is more public information available about them. This means that in the light
of theoretical considerations based on monitoring, domestic takeovers of younger firms
should be more common within the same regions. The feature that a company consists
of several establishments loosens the importance of geographical closeness. The reason
for this is that multi-establishment companies are able to gather and process information
from a broader geographical scope. Lehto and Lehtoranta (2003) already provided
evidence that an increase in the scale of a potential acquirer company measured by the
turnover positively contributes to the likelihood that a firm acquires. Geographical
closeness can play some role in this feature. In addition to this, large companies
equipped with better monitoring capacity may be able to overcome geographical
boundaries more easily than small companies. The ease of monitoring a target is
impaired when  the size of the target company measured by turnover (or by the number
of employees) increases. This suggests that the takeovers of large firms should be more
likely within the same region, other things being equal.
(Table 1, Page 22)
Based on the earlier theoretical considerations, it can be argued that the education
structure of the companies involved is an important factor for the spatial structure of
mergers. An acquiring company that consists of highly educated workers or is
characterized by extensive knowledge capital is better equipped to monitor targets. This
feature tends to downplay the role of geographical distance. In other words, it provides
support to the inter-regional mergers that occur across distant locations within a single
country. However, monitoring is more difficult when the personnel of the target
company consist of highly educated workers with specific skills. Therefore, it is
expected that mergers and acquisitions that consists of target companies with highly
educated workers are more likely to occur within the same region.
The role of knowledge capital generated by R&D investments may also have
remarkable effects on the geography of M&As. We believe that the utilization of
merged knowledge capital do not meet geographical limits so easily. In addition, the
geographical limits of M&As can be relived by the fact that the monitoring of target’s
knowledge capital that is not human-embodied is evidently relatively easy from afar,
too. As noticed by Lehto and Lehtoranta (2003) an acquirer’s R&D capital seem to10
strengthen an acquirer’s absorptive capacity and to increase therefore the likelihood of
acquisitions. We think that an acquirer’s R&D capital reflects, to some extent, an
acquirer’s ability to monitor the target and therefore it could increase the relative
probability of distant M&As. We also consider the implications of the possession of
patents. The ease to monitor the quality of a patent also from afar and a good
opportunities to utilize the contents of a patent – which a target possesses – despite the
distant location of a target suggest that the possession of patents would lengthen the
distance between an acquirer and a target, other things being equal. On the other hand,
because of the tradability of patents and vast opportunities to make license agreements
on them, there are more convenient mechanisms to transfer the knowledge included in
patents than M&As.
4 For this reason, we do not expect that the possession of patents
would necessarily have an effect on the domestic geography of M&As.
The size of regions should be important for mergers. The amount of geographical
clustering is measured by the number of firms that are located in the same region. It is
expected that mergers and acquisitions are more likely within regions that contain a
great number of firms. In addition, there is a dummy variable that captures the mergers
in which the acquiring and the target company are in the same industry. This means that
it is possible to investigate the connection between geographical closeness and
proximity across industries by using the matched data.
According to Jensen (1988), better performing companies – measured by indebtedness
or by profitability – are more willing to acquire. It is interesting to see whether there is
any spatial dimension in this respect. Fixed tangible assets of the companies involved
are chosen to capture the possibilities to take advantage of common assets. These
possibilities can often be utilized across distant locations because monitoring is more
easy with them.
4.2. Mergers
The data on mergers and acquisitions is gathered from the Talouselämä magazine,
which is published on a weekly basis. The magazine contains all mergers in which
either an acquiring or an acquired firm is a Finnish one, or in which either an acquiring
or an acquired firm is owned by a Finnish company. This means that the data is truly11
comprehensive in terms of domestic mergers. The merger data covers the period from
1989 to 2001. Because some variables are not available from 2001, most of the analysis
covers the period 1989–2000. The total number of mergers is 5126 (including non-
domestic mergers) during this period of investigation (Table 2). The sub-population of
mergers that consists of the cases where existing companies change their organizational
form without the involvement of other companies is excluded from the study of
domestic merger flows, because there fails to be, for obvious reasons, a discrepancy of
location in terms of the acquiring and the target company for these particular mergers.
The Talouselämä magazine contains the list of the names of the companies that have
been involved in the transactions. This means that it is possible to manually link the
firm codes to those names of the companies listed by the magazine.
(Table 2, Page 24)
4.3. Financial status of companies
The information about domestic mergers is linked to the Business Register and
Financial Statements Data by the firm codes. The VINTAGE, the MULTI, the
TURNOVER, the PROFITS, the DEBTS, and the FIXED variables are obtained from
the Business Register and Financial Statements Data.
4.4. Information about the personnel of companies
This matched data is then linked to Employment Statistics also maintained by Statistics
Finland, which compiles information on the economic activity of individuals and their
background characteristics (such as the education of an employee). Employment
Statistics contains a piece of information (i.e. firm code) on the employee’s employer in
the last week of each year. This makes it possible to link the Employment Statistics to
the Business Register in order to create linked longitudinal employer-employee data.
Employment Statistics effectively covers the whole population.
5 The variables that
capture the size of the company measured by the number of employees and the
educational structure of the companies involved are obtained from Employment
Statistics.12
4.5. Knowledge capital
The number of patents that capture a perspective on the knowledge capital are obtained
from the comprehensive registers of the National Board of Patents and Registration of
Finland. The information about R&D expenditures that is used to calculate the R&D
stock of the companies involved can be obtained from R&D surveys of the Finnish
companies, 1989, 1991–2000.
6 Matching is made possible by the fact that R&D surveys
by Statistics Finland contain the same firm codes as the Business Register, Financial
Statements Data and Employment Statistics.
4.6. Geographical closeness
The Talouselämä magazine contains information about the geographical location of the
targets classified in terms of the Finnish municipalities. This measure of location is a
plant-level measure. This information about the location of targets can then be
aggregated to various geographical divisions of Finland (including the so-called NUTS
regions by the European Union).
7 Most acquiring companies have only one site. In
those cases the definition of the location is unambiguous. But when acquiring
companies have many sites the location is defined according to the site which has the
largest number of personnel. The geographical location of acquiring companies is
obtained from the Business Register by Statistics Finland as it contains the home
municipality of the Finnish companies. First, the geographical closeness is defined as a
case when acquiring and acquired companies are located in the same region. Second,
the geographical closeness is measured as a distance between acquiring and acquired
companies. The distance is measured in kilometres based on the location of acquiring
and acquired companies at the municipality level.
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5. Stylized features
The geographical pattern of domestic mergers and acquisitions is interesting in
Finland.
9 Table 3 shows that a great number of domestic mergers occur within narrowly
defined regions. For instance, about 38% of the total number of domestic mergers occur
within the same provinces. In contrast, roughly 31% of domestic mergers and
acquisitions occur within the same industry by using the 2-digit industry classification13
by Statistics Finland. The Kernel density estimate of distance decay function based on
the Finnish municipalities further underlines the important role of geographical
closeness (Figure 1).
10 Thus, the volume of domestic mergers substantially declines as
there is an increase in the distance between the acquiring and the target company
provided that a domestic merger has occurred in the first place.
(Table 3, Page 25)
(Figure 1, Page 27)
The information provided in Table 3 and Figure 1 suggests that geographical closeness
is very important for domestic M&As. However, it may also reflect the fact that most
firms are located in the Helsinki metropolitan area (a NUTS4 region) – which is a part
of the Uusimaa province (a NUTS3 region) – or in a few other NUTS4 regions. To take
explicitly into account the density of firms in various sub-regions, we have compared
the actual share of intra-regional mergers with the hypothetical probability for the intra-
regional mergers in a situation in which the acquiring firm chooses the target firm
randomly, given the existing locations of the firms in Finland. This probability is
denoted by ) (n p . Its derivation is presented in Appendix 1. Using the data on the
number of firms in various sub-regions (their turnover is above FIM 3 million and they
are included in the Business Register by Statistics Finland), we have computed  ) (n p .
The share of actual intra-regional acquisitions of all acquisitions for the NUTS4 regions
and derived  ) (n p  are presented in Figure 2. The share of actual intra-regional
acquisitions is well above  ) (n p  over the period of investigation supporting the
conclusion that the acquiring firms tend to locate geographically close to the target
firms.
(Figure 2, Page 28)
The share of the Finnish provinces in the total volume of takeover activity by acquiring
companies shows the overwhelming dominance of Uusimaa, which is the heaviest
populated area in Finland (Figure 3). Although the share of Uusimaa in the total volume
of takeover activity by target companies is also high, it is not as high as the share of14
takeover activity by acquiring companies.
11 This means that the firms located in the
province of Uusimaa are gradually gaining control of firms located in the rest of the
Finnish regions in net terms by conducting mergers and acquisitions. The losers of
control seem to be fairly evenly distributed across the other NUTS3 regions, including
provinces such as Varsinais-Suomi, Pohjois-Savo and Pohjois-Pohjanmaa. This feature
means that domestic mergers and acquisitions substantially reinforce the core-periphery
dimension of the Finnish economic geography in an interesting way. In this sense, the
situation is the same as in Canada.
(Figure 3, Page 29)
6. Explaining geographical closeness
An important feature in the interpretation of the findings is that a number of variables are
able to capture the monitoring capacity of an acquiring company and the potential of an
acquiring company to obtain economics of scope and complementaries from a merger.
Moreover, a number of variables that characterize the target companies are able to capture
the possibilities to monitor a target company and complementaries from a merger. The
most important finding from matched data is that the strong ability by an acquiring
company to monitor the target (measured by the educational level of the staff) is able to
support mergers that occur across distant locations, other things being equal. The same
pattern applies to knowledge capital of an acquiring company measured by the R&D stock.
This observation is consistent with the earlier theoretical considerations for the role of
distance in inter-regional mergers and acquisitions within a single country.
The findings are reported in Table 4. (Additional results are reported in Appendix 2-3.) A
number of interesting patterns emerge despite the fact that a substantial number of
domestic mergers and acquisitions is lost in the construction of the matched data. The
results from Table 4 show that the likelihood that a domestic merger occurs within the
same municipality decreases as the age of the target company increases. This pattern is in
line with the feature that the activities of older companies are easier to monitor for
acquiring companies. As a result, the young target companies are more likely to be located
geographically near the acquiring company. Geographical closeness matters less for
acquiring companies that consist of a number of establishments. In addition, the likelihood15
that a domestic merger will occur within the same municipality decreases as the turnover
of the acquiring company increases.
12 This means that the larger companies are able to
overcome the geographical boundaries of municipalities more easily. The results show that
the agglomeration of companies matters a great deal for the pattern of domestic mergers.
Thus, mergers are substantially more likely to occur within regions that contain a great
number of companies. The variables that capture patents of the companies involved are
not statistically significant and the insignificant coefficient of the SAMEINDU variable
shows that geographical closeness and proximity across industries are not related. These
results are robust across models.
(Table 4, Page 26)
The findings for the DISTANCE variable reveal an interesting pattern according to
which the high share of highly educated employees with technical qualifications in an
acquiring company is able to support mergers that occur across distant locations. The
explanation for this is that those particular acquiring companies have more capacity to
monitor the target companies. In contrast, the coefficient of the EDU2 variable for the
target company implies the same pattern as explaining the PROXIMITY variable for
NUTS5 regions. Our reading of this evidence is that difficulties to monitor the target
companies tend to compress the distance between the acquiring and the target company as
suggested by the earlier theoretical notions.
The results from the estimation of models that include financial variables are reported in
Appendix 2. The indebtedness (DEBT) of a target firm or an acquiring firm seems to have
no impact on the geographical dimension of domestic mergers and acquisitions. The
reported results concerning the impact of the PROFITS variable give some evidence that
those targets which are in good shape in terms of profitability can be monitored across
distant locations. This increases the share of those domestic mergers in which the target
firm is located in another area than an acquiring firm. The fixed tangible assets of the
target firm (FIXED) negatively contribute to the geographical closeness between a target
firm and an acquiring firm. This feature may reflect the fact that it is easy to monitor the
quality of fixed tangible assets. Therefore, the target company can locate in a location that
is distant from an acquiring firm.16
Finally, the impact of R&D stock on the economic geography of domestic mergers and
acquisitions is considered. The number of observations substantially decreases due to the
size of the R&D survey data by Statistics Finland. The findings that are reported in
Appendix 3 reveal that an increase in the R&D stock of acquiring companies decreases the
likelihood of mergers that occur within the same regions. As stressed earlier, this feature
may reflect the strengthened monitoring capacity of acquiring companies, but it may also
hint that the acquiring firms possess knowledge capital of which joint utilization is not
geographically restricted after a merger. In this respect, it is noteworthy that the R&D
stock of the target firm has no impact on the geographical dimension of domestic
takeovers.
7. Conclusions
This study explored mergers and acquisitions from the regional perspective. The
Finnish evidence reveals that geographical closeness matters a great deal for inter-
regional mergers and acquisitions. This means that a great number of domestic mergers
occur within narrowly defined regions. In other words, there is a strong home bias in
domestic mergers and acquisitions. In addition, domestic merger flows substantially
reinforce the core-periphery dimension in Finland. In particular, firms in the province of
Uusimaa, where most of the economic activity is located, are gradually gaining control
of firms located in the rest of the Finnish regions in net terms by conducting mergers
and acquisitions across regions.
This study investigated domestic inter-regional mergers by using matched data. This
means that the study was based on the comprehensive public data on domestic mergers
that was matched to the micro-level data sources maintained by Statistics Finland in
order to obtain variables that help to characterize the companies involved. The most
important finding from matched data is that the strong ability by an acquiring company to
monitor the target (measured by the educational level of the staff) is able to support
mergers that occur across distant locations, other things being equal. This result is
consistent with the theoretical considerations according to which ability to monitor by
acquiring company that deteriorates with an increase in distance provides an explanation
for geograhical closeness of mergers and acquisitions. In addition, an increase in the R&D
stock of acquiring companies decreases the likelihood of mergers that occur within the17
same regions. This feature may reflect the strengthened monitoring capacity of acquiring
companies, but it may also hint that the acquiring firms possess knowledge capital of
which joint utilization is not geographically restricted after merger or acquisition.
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Table 1. Description of the variables.
Variables Definition/measurement
Financial status of companies:
VINTAGE The age of a firm is measured in years. The variable
is the employment-weighted average of the ages of
firm’s plants (Source: Business Register by
Statistics Finland).
MULTI Company consists of several establishments=1,
otherwise 0 (Source: Business Register by Statistics
Finland).
TURNOVER A log of the turnover of a firm (Source: Business
Register by Statistics Finland).
PROFITS Gross margin divided by the turnover of a firm
(Source: Financial Statements Data by Statistics
Finland).
DEBTS Short- and long-term debts divided by the total
assets of a firm (Source: Financial Statements Data
by Statistics Finland).
FIXED A log of fixed tangible assets (Source: Financial
Statements Data by Statistics Finland).
Information about the personnel of companies:
SIZE A log of the size of a firm measured by the number
of employees (Source: Employment Statistics by
Statistics Finland).
EDU1 The share of highly educated with technical
qualifications of the total number of employees in a
firm (Source: Employment Statistics by Statistics
Finland).
EDU2 The share of highly educated (excluding the number
of highly educated with technical qualifications) of
the total number of employees in a firm (Source:
Employment Statistics by Statistics Finland).
Knowledge capital:
PATENTS1 The number of domestic patents that firm owns
currently (Source: the National Board of Patents and
Registration of Finland).
PATENTS2 The number of U.S. registred patents that firm owns
currently (Source: the National Board of Patents and
Registration of Finland).
R&D R&D stock of a company that is estimated based on
the previous R&D expenditures (see Lehto and
Lehtoranta 2003).
Geographical closeness:
PROXIMITY Acquiring and acquired companies are located in the
same NUTS-region=1, otherwise 0 (Source:
Talouselämä magazine and Business Register by
Statistics Finland).
DISTANCE A log of distance is defined as a distance in23
kilometres between acquiring and acquired
companies (Source: Statistics Finland based on
GIS).
Geographical clustering:
AGGLOMERATION A log of  the number of firms those turnover is over
FIM 3 million in the same region (Source: Business
Register by Statistics Finland). The variables are
separately calculated for the locations of acquiring
and target companies. This restriction of FIM 3
million is the same restriction as the one used by the
Talouselämä magazine in its listings of mergers.
Additional variables:
YEARS 12-1
SAMEINDU The acquiring company and the target company are
in the same 2-digit industry as classified by
Statistics Finland=1, otherwise 0.24
Table 2. The data about mergers in Finland 1989–2000 (Source: Talouselämä
magazine).
Definition Number of mergers
All mergers listed by the magazine (1989-2000) 5126
The acquiring company is located in a foreign country 880
The target company is located in a foreign country 685
Internal reorganization of a domestic firm 589
Domestic mergers used in the analysis 297225
Table 3. The share of domestic mergers in which the acquiring company and the target
company are located in the same region of Finland 1989–2000 (i.e. the values of the
PROXIMITY variable) (Sources: Talouselämä magazine and Business Register by
Statistics Finland).
Regional division: Share (%)
NUTS5-regions (446 regions) 20.3
NUTS4-regions (85 regions) 32.9
NUTS3-regions (21 regions) 38.226

























VINTAGE (acquirer) 0.001606 0.7 0.004273 1.31 0.004729 1.41 -1.71475* -1.84
VINTAGE (target) -0.00865** -3.87 -0.00375 -1.2 -0.00501* -1.58 0.528337 0.59
MULTI (acquirer) -0.07268** -2.38 -0.18319** -4.26 -0.15085** -3.51 17.7116 1.46
MULTI (target) -0.03618 -1.06 -0.01833 -0.38 -0.04901 -1.01 32.78766** 2.42
TURNOVER (acquirer) -0.0185** -2.09 -0.03583** -2.85 -0.01698 -1.38 9.129417** 2.71
TURNOVER (target) 0.011698 1.4 0.030547** 2.58 0.001107 0.09 -1.56039 -0.48
EDU1 (acquirer) -0.03747 -0.4 -0.2543* -1.88 -0.21657* -1.52 106.4833** 2.66
EDU1 (target) 0.019036 0.19 0.039877 0.29 -0.06638 -0.45 20.17847 0.49
EDU2 (acquirer) 0.376527** 2.48 -0.13606 -0.62 0.083448 0.33 -112.422* -1.52
EDU2 (target) 0.358769** 2.5 0.272824 1.21 0.129245 0.53 -131.6* -1.84
PATENTS1 (acquirer) 0.0037133 1.08 0.000541 0.09 0.000673 0.13 0.434065 0.5
PATENTS1 (target) 0.003196 0.33 0.001222 0.34 0.001412 0.35 -0.12253 -0.12
PATENTS2 (acquirer) 0.0147224 -1.32 -0.01197 -0.75 -0.01678 -1.19 -1.5167 -0.77
PATENTS2 (target) 0.0070497 -0.51 -0.00398 -0.57 -0.00323 -0.43 -0.62791 -0.32
AGGLOMERATION (acquirer) 0.109836** 8.53 0.105696** 5.63 -7.50257** -2.17
AGGLOMERATION (target) .. .. 0.149847** 12.09 0.205489** 11.14 -42.0703** -12.27
SAMEINDU 0.0247529* 1.74 0.051463 1.48 0.00052 0.01 5.861413 0.6
Pseudo R
2 for Probit models 0.08 0.36 0.22 ..
Number of observations 1057 1057 1057 1056
Notes: ** (*) indicates that the parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 5 (10) per cent significance level.27
Figure 1. The estimated distance decay function based on the distances between
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Figure 2. The computational probability of an intra-regional merger and the value of the
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Figure 3. The share of the Finnish provinces in the total volume of takeover activity by
acquiring and target companies 1989–2000 (Source: Talouselämä magazine).
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Appendix 1. The calculation of computational probability of an intra-regional merger.
Suppose there are N firms in the whole country, and that the number of firms in the sub-
region i is  . i n  Then  N n
i i = ∑ . The number of intra-regional combinations of two firms








which is denoted by  ). ( i n c  The total number of








. This figure is denoted by  ). (N c  The
computational probability, denoted by  ) (n p , for such random acquisitions in which









= . We have calculated  ) (n p  annually. The larger the number of sub-regions is
and the more asymmetrically the firms are distributed over the sub-regions, the lower
) (n p  is. At the highest  ) (n p  approaches 0.5 (when there are only two sub-regions of
equal size and the number of firms is large). Calculating  ) (n p , we have taken into
account all those firms of which turnover exceeds FIM 3 million (the same limit which
is valid in our M&A-data) in all sub-regions of Finland.31
Appendix 2. The estimation results (with t-statistics), 1989–2001. The results for Probit models are reported as marginal effects. The models
























MULTI (acquirer) -0.02653 -0.86 -0.05448 -1.28 -0.09267** -2.23 32.66166** 2.66
MULTI (target) -0.08361** -0.28 -0.03277** -0.82 -0.03876** -0.99 15.26331 1.35
TURNOVER (acquirer) -0.03296** -3.41 -0.05063** -3.76 -0.04145** -3.17 11.44529 2.99
TURNOVER (target) 0.04593** 4.44 0.03820** 2.79 0.03733** 2.76 -10.4392 -2.62
DEBT (acquirer) -0.02497 -0.49 -0.04550 -0.65 -0.09612 -1.39 -1.93905 -0.1
DEBT (target) -0.04813* -1.57 -0.00369 -0.88 -0.00629 -0.16 2.916385 0.26
PROFITS (acquirer) -0.00043 -0.15 -0.00306 0.70 -0.00008 -0.02 -0.74789 -0.59
PROFITS (target) -0.00982** -2.45 -0.07509* -1.98 -0.06965* -1.78 3.550034* 1.74
FIXED (acquirer) 0.003104 0.41  0.01368 1.27 -0.01097 1.04 -5.58167* -1.84
FIXED (target) -0.03769** -5.01 -0.02439** -2.42 -0.02327** -2.37 6.087698** 2.07
AGGLOMERATION (acquirer) .. .. 0.045174** 4.11 0.027261* 1.71 3.51344 1.13
AGGLOMERATION (target) .. .. 0.193173** 16.67 0.264568** 16.18 -54.4194** -17.06
Pseudo R
2 for Probit models 0.06 0.34 0.24 ..
Number of observations 1330 1330 1330 1330
Notes: ** (*) indicates that the parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 5 (10) per cent significance level.32
Appendix 3. The estimation results (with t-statistics), 1989–2000. The results for Probit models are reported as marginal effects. The models
























VINTAGE (acquirer) 0.000878 0.35 0.001567 0.4 0.004851 1.15 -2.69061** -2.19
VINTAGE (target) -0.00526** -2.35 -0.0053* -1.54 -0.01176** -3.06 1.679965* 1.53
MULTI (acquirer) -0.01295 -0.42 -0.14347** -2.92 -0.20265** -3.84 23.84076* 1.59
MULTI (target) -0.00253 -0.07 -0.0207 -0.35 -0.10479* -1.68 49.63836** 2.75
TURNOVER (acquirer) -0.00861 -0.86 -0.00838 -0.53 0.004121 0.24 2.601524 0.53
TURNOVER (target) 0.000719 0.08 0.020969* 1.5 0.014368 0.93 -7.60571* -1.73
R&D (acquirer) -0.0245** -2.02 -0.05416** -3.1 -0.07741** -4.09 14.83996** 2.83
R&D (target) -0.00372 -0.28 -0.01665 -0.87 -0.03042 -1.43 6.416652 1.08
AGGLOMERATION1 (acquirer) 0.003193 .. 0.106538 7.6 0.130849** 5.74 -7.68372* -1.84
AGGLOMERATION1 (target) .. .. 0.14367 10.11 0.215447** 9.35 -44.0449** -10.14
SAMEINDU 0.003193 0.12 0.007889 0.19 -0.04449 -0.99 21.60481* 1.7
Pseudo R
2 for Probit models 0.06 0.39 0.27 ..
Number of observations 678 678 678 678
Notes: ** (*) indicates that the parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 5 (10) per cent significance level.33
                                                          
1 Deneckere and Davidson (1985) have shown earlier that the coalition formation can be
profitable for its members in the Bertnard competition, because the rest of the companies raise
their prices in response to a price increase by the merged companies.
2 In case of so-called ’mergers of equals’ monitoring can be considered to be mutual by its
nature. This case is, however, beoynd the scope of the presentation.
3 See Böckerman and Lehto (2003).
4 As noticed by Lehto and Lehtoranta (2002), M&A is an appropriate mean to transfer
knowledge when trading or contractual mechanisms are ruled out.
5 The primary data of Employment Statistics is gathered altogether from 22 different sources.
The observation unit of Employment Statistics is a person. The Central Population Register is
one of the basic registers in the Employment Statistics system. The information on employment
relationships is obtained from several different sources. The Central Pensions Security Institute
provides all the available data on employment relationships within the private sector in the
Finnish economy. In particular, it lists all employment relationships lasting over one month
during the one-year period.
6 The procedure to calculate the R&D stock variable is explained in detail in Lehto and
Lehtoranta (2003).
7 The regional divisions of Finland are based on the various NUTS regions stipulated by the
European Union. All in all, there are three kinds of NUTS regions in this study. The NUTS534
                                                                                                                                                                         
regions correspond to the Finnish municipalities (the total number of these regions is 446). The
so-called NUTS4 regions consist of commuting areas. The number of these regions is 85. In
addition, there are NUTS3 regions that correspond to the provinces of Finland. The number of
these regions is 21.
8 The point of location of a firm within a municipality is based on the concentration of economic
activity within that particular municipality as defined by Statistics Finland. For this reason, for
instance, the distance between the municipalities of Vantaa and Helsinki is twelve kilometres
despite the fact that these municipalities are located near to one another and they share elements
of common borders.
9 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) report that geographical distance matters for stockholding in
Finland. In particular, investors in various municipalities in Finland prefer to hold and trade
stocks headquartered in nearby locations to those in more distant locations.
10 The Epanechnikov is the applied kernel density estimate. It has the property that it is the most
efficient in minimizing the mean integrated squared error. DiNardo and Tobias (2001) provide a
survey of nonparametric density and regression estimation. The non-parametric smoothing of
the observations by the Kernel density estimate explain the small negative values for the
distance observed in the left-hand side of the figure.
11 An important feature of the data is that Talouselämä magazine contains a description of plant-
level measure of targets. However, the unreported results based on the firm-level measure that
are obtained from the Business Register by Statistics Finland carry the same conclusion.35
                                                                                                                                                                         
12 There are two ways to measure the scale of the involved companies. The results remain the
same if the scale of a company is measured by the SIZE variable instead of the TURNOVER
variable.